Web Admin Blog Real Web Admins. Real World Experience.

24Sep/080

Enterprise Security API – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

This presentation was by Jeff Williams, OWASP Chair, on the Enterprise Security API.

Vulnerabilities and Security Controls

  • Missing - 35%
  • Broken - 30%
  • Ignored - 20%
  • Misused - 15%

Goal is to enable developers.  Need to give them hands-on training, a secure coding guideline, and an Enterprise Security API.

The problem with Security Libraries: overpowerful, incomplete, not integrated, broken, can't update, custom.

Enterprise Security API (ESAPI) includes authentication, user, AccessController, AccessReferenceMap, Validator, ENcoder, HTTPUtilities, Encryptor, EncryptedProperties, Randomizer, Exception Handling, Logger, IntrusionDetection, and SecurityConfiguration.  Built on top of your existing enterprise services or libraries.

Some Examples

  1. Input Validation - validation engine and decoding engine that will take input and provide safe output for web pages
  2. Output Encoding - need to use the right encoding for the right place you are putting the encoding
  3. Authentication - creates a user object and functions to login() or logout().  Provides additional functionality for encrypted cookies, changing SESSIONID, remember me cookies, etc.
  4. Access Control - provides functionality to check if a user is authorized for URLs, functions, data, services, or files.
  5. Direct Object Reference Protection - use an access reference map that does an indirect translation between an object and it's reference.  Use getDirectReference() and getIndirectReference() functions.
  6. Error, Logging, and Detection - Configurable thresholds.  Responses are log intrusion, logout user, and disable account.  User object is available anywhere in the application so the logger links the messages logged to a user.  Exceptions sent to an intrusion detector which has thresholds set.

OWASP ESAPI Covers Majority of OWASP Top Ten

  • A1. XSS - Validator, Encoder
  • A2. Injection Flaws - Encoder
  • A3. Malicious File Execution - HTTPUtilities (Safe Upload)
  • A4. Insecure Direct Object Reference - AccessReferenceMap, AccessController
  • A5. CSRF - User (CSRF TOken)
  • A6. Leakage and Improper Error Handling - EnterpriseSecurityException, HTTPUtils
  • A7. Broken Authenticationa nd Sessions - Authenticator, User, HTTPUtils
  • A8. Insecure Cryptographic Storage - Encryptor
  • A9. Insecure Communications - HTTPUtilities (Secure Cookie, Channel)
  • A10. Failure to Restrict URL Access - AccessController

MITRE found that all application security tool vendors' claims put together cover only 45% of the known vulnerability types (695).  They found very little overlap between tools, so to get 45% you need them all (assuming their claims are true).  This means that at least 55% is not covered by tools.

Latest version released in September 2008 (1.3.1) and are holding a summit later this year to determine if they got everything right.  In active development.  Java, .NET, PHP, classic ASP.  Rich client extensions.  Web service extensions.  Framework (Struts) integration.

Written under the BSD license so it should be very easy for you to use it in your applciations.

Project Home Page: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI

Expert advisory/design/implementation team that has collectively reviewed over 100 million lines of code.  ~600 JUnit test cases.  FindBugs, PMD, Ounce, and Fortify clean.  Code review by several Java security experts.  Penetration test of sample applications.  Full Javadoc for all functions.

Presentation will be posted on homepage.  Includes a list of banned API's that ESAPI replaces.  Has example of enterprise cost savings.  All of ESAPI is only 5000 lines of code.  Building a ESAPI swingset which has a demo of insecure (what can go wrong) and secure (using ESAPI) programming and good tutorial on how to use.  Login module shows last successful login, last failed login, number of failed logins, enforces a strong password policy.

24Sep/081

JBroFuzz: Building a Java Fuzzer for the Web – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

This presentation was by Yiannis Pavlosoglou who is the developer on the OWASP fuzzing project.

Address the challenges of fuzzing, during applicaton layer penetration tests and security assessments.  Designed for fuzzing web applications.  Open-source and free.  Written in Java.  Scriptable.

Fuzzer Workflow

  • Select fuzzers
  • Send requests
  • Collect responses
  • Compare results

Building a fuzzer entails a stable, ease to use interface, a solid fuzzing engine, and unconventional protocol APIs.

Likely Problems:

  • How do you group payloads?
  • How do you customize/iterate through permutations?
  • Cannot use Apache HTTP Commons
  • Cannot use Java HTTP/S Libraries

Addressing Problems:

  • Graphical User Interface
  • Write requests/responses to a file
  • Payloads read from file
  • Payloads grouped into fuzzers
  • Fuzzers grouped into categories
  • Use TCP Sockets for fuzzing
  • Implement POST "Content-Length"
  • Support SSL sockets for fuzzing
  • Support HTTP/1.1 chunked encoding

47 classes spread into 13 packages.  13,123 lines of java code.  Do one thing and do it well!  Tell the user what you are putting on the wire.  Don't obey HTTP/S.  Trust the JBroFuzz Core to generate payloads.

Roadmap

  • MSI Installer
  • Basic NTLM Authentication
  • Proxy Requests
  • Graphing Tab

E-mail yiannis@owasp.org with questions.

24Sep/0815

New 0Day Browser Exploit: Clickjacking – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

This talk was rumored to have been cancelled at a vulnerable vendors (Adobe) request, but Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen decided to do parts of the talk anyway.  Here's my notes from the semi-restricted presentation.

Jeremiah started off with a brief introduction on what clickjacking is.  In a nutshell, it's when you visit a malicious website and the attacker is able to take control of the links that your browser visits.  The problem affects all of the different browsers except something like lynx.  The issue has nothing to do with JavaScript so turning JavaScript off in your browser will not help you.  It's a fundamental flaw with the way your browser works and cannot be fixed with a simple patch.  With this exploit, once you're on the malicious web page, the bad guy can make you click on any link, any button, or anything on the page without you even seeing it happening.  "A normal user wouldn't have any idea of what is going on.  People in this audience may see something a little different from what they would expect and you would definitely see the results in the page's source code."  Ebay, for example, would be vulnerable to this since you could embed javascript into the web page, although, javascript is not required to exploit this.  "It makes it easier in many ways, but you do not need it."  Use lynx to protect yourself and don't do dynamic anything.  You can "sort of" fill out forms and things like that.  The exploit requires DHTML.  Not letting yourself be framed (framebusting code) will prevent cross-domain clickjacking, but an attacker can still force you to click any links on their page.  Each click by the user equals a clickjacking click so something like a flash game is perfect bait. The issue and fix will probably be originally released on http://ihackcharities.org.

My Analysis: It sounds like the exploit basically creates a frame that is hidden underneath the main content frame that a user is seeing.  The main content could be a flash game or any sort of incentive to keep a user clicking.  All of the clicks that the user is making are used to click on content in the hidden frame. Again, just my speculation based on the information provided by RSnake and Jeremiah above.

24Sep/082

Get Rich or Die Trying – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

Unfortunately, the conference provided lunch today, but did not provide us time to eat it so I had to eat while listening to this talk.  It was by Trey Ford and Jeremiah Grossman from Whitehat Security and I'm pretty sure they've done it before.  You may even be able to download a copy of the presentation off of http://www.whitehatsec.com.  The gist of the presentation is that while you can use a web application vulnerability scanner to find things like SQL injection or cross-site scripting, there are still a lot of very serious business logic flaws that won't get caught by those tools.  A malicious person could exploit these business logic flaws for anything from helping a Chihuahua win a dog contest to making millions trading on insider information or running affiliate scams.  Some of the exploits presented were so easy that your mom could figure out how to do it and didn't require ANY technical skills.  While the presentation may have not been technical enough for the majority of the people attending this conference, I still give props to Whitehat for putting together a decent presentation on how hackers are using business logic flaws to make money on the web.  Be sure to e-mail Whitehat and ask to see the presentation.

24Sep/080

Web Application Security Roadmap – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

For the first session of the day, I decided to check out the Web Application Security Roadmap presentation by Joe White, President of Cyberlocksmith Corporation.  Web application security is still very much in it's infancy.  Traditional "operations" teams do not understand web application security risk and are ill-equipped to defend against web application threats.  Many companies are wrestling with who takes ownership of web application security.  Still trying to figure out where they fit in the organization.  Security "turf battles" are inevitable in these situations.  No clear separation between where web app sec stops and traditional operation security begins.

Begin by building a foundation.  Find your web application vulnerabilities.  Address your web application vulnerabilities.  Monitor/detect web application compromise attempts.  Decide upon threat classification framework and scoring model.  Develop web application incident response plan.

Next, look at your internal projects.  Scope/prioritize internal web application specific projects.  Proactively increase security awareness.  Threat modeling and data flow diagrams.  Manual code review (outside expert).  Other possible roadmap items to consider.

To find web application vulnerabilities, there is an automated component and a manual component.  For the automated component, choose the automated assessment tool that works best with your web application technology.  Make sure you are addressing all internet facing web application exposure.  Deploy a static source code analysis tool to scan for security vulnerabilities within the source code.  The manual component is required to compliment the automated assessment.  You work to better educate manual assessment teams of the way your web application functions so they can better detect logic flaws and other pieces likely to be missed by the automated scans.  Integrate both peer code review and manual review of the static source code analysis results into your SDLC.

Web Application Security Assessment CapEx and Deployment Times

  • 30 days to evaluate each vendor if conducting a bake-off
  • 0-4 weeks to deploy chosen tool after the evaluation phase
  • CapEx for web application security assessment tools will vary between vendors.  Budget for 25-50k

Static Source Code Analysis CapEx and Implementation Times

  • 30 days to evaluate each vendor if conducting a bake-off
  • 3-6 weeks to deploy chosen tool after the evaluation phase
  • CapEx will vary between vendors and will likely depend on the chosen deployment scenario as well as how many developers are using hte tool.  Budget for 50-105k (1-3k per developer)

Mitigate immediate internet facing risk.  Block your exposure from web application vulnerabilities as close as possible to when they are discovered.  THIS IS CRITICAL!  Buys you time to fix vulnerabilities in the underlying code.  WAF will minimize threat window for each exposure by blocking access to vulnerability until it can be fixed in the code.

Address the vulnerabilities in the code.  Web app sec assessment tool should assist in locating specific code level changes that need to be made.  Static Source Code analysis will point directly to specific code level changes that need to be made.

WAF Vendors: Breach, ModSecurity, Imperva, F5, Citrix, Barracuda, Deny All, BeeWare, BinarySEC, Cisco, and Fortify Real-Time Analysis.

WAF Firewall CapEx and Deployment Times

  • 30 days to evaluate each vendor if conducting a bake-off
  • 4-8 weeks to deploy chosen tool after the evaluation phase
  • Ongoing management and fine-tuning can be expected after deployment
  • CapEx varies between vendors.  Expect approximately 25-40k per appliance and need at least two for redundancy
  • Budget for 75-100k (more for presence at multiple datacenters)

Check out wafreviews.com!  It's a webappsec community supported site for information and resources related to WAF Reviews and Evaluations.  If you have participated in a recent bake-off of WAF technology and are able to share your results, feel free to forward your evaluation results to submit@wafreviews.com.  Mission is to be fair, objective, and comprehensive.

Detecting web application compromise attempts.  Use a WAF!  Looks at Web Application (Layer 7) data and acts upon it.  Similar to traditional network (Layer 4) firewall.  But more like a gateway than a firewall.  Likes to call it a "Web Application Risk Management (WARM)" device.  Device sits between your normal firewall and your web application server.

WAF Use Cases

  • Web intrusion detection and prevention
  • Continuous security assessment
  • Virtual (or just-in-time) patching
  • HTTP traffic logging and monitoring
  • Network building blocks
  • Web application hardening

Detect web application compromise attempts.  You cannot protect what you cannot see.  You will need greater visibility into application layer traffic.  This is usually the place that traditional operations security folks do not understand.  WAF should monitor and detect application anomalies and compromise attempts from users.  WAF offers greater visibility into application security events.  As WAF market matures, you can expect the WAF to be fed real-time vulnerabilities by your web application security assessment tool in order to proactively block newly discovered attacks.  The tricky part here is that you will likely need the help of the traditional operations security guys to help you implement and succeed.

Decide upon threat classification framework.

Develop a web application incident response plan.  This is the piece overlooked by most organizations.  You do not want to be blind-sided by a web application security event while you are earning the trust of both your management and peers.

webappir.com  Seeking presentations and other educational material to assist web application security professionals.

Don't let internal projects distract you from building the foundation!  Integrate security into the SDLC.  Secured development lifecycle.

Increase security awareness.  Executive web application security risk awareness.  Developer training.

Threat modeling and data flow diagrams.  Understand all entry and exit points into the web application.  Understand threat scenarios.

Manual code review (outside expert).  Include all tiers in the application architecture.  Address internet facing code first and then move on to application tier and then database tier.

Other roadmap items to consider.  DDoS attacks.  Anti-phishing.  Seecurity Center - reporting features of WAF should be available for users to increase security awareness and proactively address security weaknesses.  Web application security metrics.

Information security risks and threats change over time.  You must adapt to these changes.  Web application security is the current threat that you need to understand and be adapting to.  If you are new, it is OK because there is still time to change and adapt.  Don't be an information security dinosaur.  Latest version of the presentation available at http://www.webappsecroadmap.com

24Sep/080

Day 1 Keynote – OWASP AppSec NYC 2008

I'm currently at the OWASP AppSec 2008 Conference in New York City and am listening to the keynote presentation shared by the board of OWASP.  Starting off is Jeff Williams, Chair of OWASP.  He talked about OWASP's mission, what we're currently working on, and offered the following suggestions on how to take OWASP into the future:

1) Prioritize

  • You can't "hack" code secure.
  • Use risk metrics.

2) Set a useful research agenda

  • Don't spend time searching for obscure vulnerabilities
  • Create tools that verify that software does the RIGHT thing instead of just looking for problems.

3) Turn application security from a black art to a science

  • OWASP in School program
  • Translating OWASP Top 10 and various books and projects into other languages.
  • Printing guides, books, and manuals for cost of printing.  Free downloads online.

4) We can enable secure coding

  • Breaking things is easy, try creating something secure and tell people how you did it.
  • Check out the OWASP Enterprise Security API Project
  • Increased visibility (software should provide info on who built it, what libraries they used, etc)

5) Make application security into a movement

  • Evangelize application security
  • Show people what an application security program looks like

Next up was Dave Wichers.  He talked about the OWASP goals of improving quality and support.  OWASP is publishing a "desk reference" guide on application security.  Community outreach is a huge focus of OWASP.  Over 100 chapters around the world.  Dave is the Conference Chair and helps to organize these conferences.  Let him know if you're interested in putting one on.

Tom Brennan, head of NY/NJ chapter and OWASP Board Member starts talking about over 10,000 members on the mailing list and over 120 chapters involved in OWASP effort.  Says you should get involved in OWASP!

Next up is Dinis Cruz, another board member, who says he comes up with all sorts of crazy ideas for OWASP.  Helped come up with the OWASP Grants ideas when the Belgium chapter had extra money in the bank.  OWASP Spring of Code 2007 sponsored 26 projects at $125,000.  Summor of Code 2008 has 31 grants and they are focusing on quality with reviewers, project managers, etc.  OWASP has given out over $250,000 in grants since the Seasons of Code project started.  Then he started talking about the OWASP EU Summit happening in Portugal in 2008 in November.  Nice hotel by the seafront.  Go to meet all of the guys who are influential in OWASP.  Coming up with a bunch of training courses that are completely OWASP related and mostly done by our leaders.  Lots of working sessions to start discussing projects and set the AppSec agenda for 2009.  Five nights at a 5 star hotel for 300 Euros if you share a room or 600 euros if you want a single.  It's a deal!  If you're at the conference, they're giving out free books.

Last up is Sebastian Deleersnyder who compares OWASP to Second Life.  A lot of people doing this as a second job, but it's also a virtual community.  Asks chapter leaders to stand up and everyone gives them a hand.  *pats self on the back*  End of keynote.