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		<title>Virtualization Security Best Practices from a Customer&#8217;s and Vendor&#8217;s Perspective</title>
		<link>http://www.webadminblog.com/index.php/2009/06/25/virtualization-security-best-practices-from-a-customers-and-vendors-perspective/</link>
		<comments>http://www.webadminblog.com/index.php/2009/06/25/virtualization-security-best-practices-from-a-customers-and-vendors-perspective/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2009 20:04:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Josh</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Virtualization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[best]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[brian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collapsed]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[customer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[engle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[practices]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[randell]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rob]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[separation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[temple]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vendor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vmware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[zone]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.webadminblog.com/?p=266</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The next session during the ISSA half-day seminar on Virtualization and Cloud Computing Security was on security best practices from a customer and vendor perspective.  It featured Brian Engle, CIO of Temple Inland, and Rob Randell, CISSP and Senior Security Specialist at VMware, Inc.  My notes from the presentation are below: Temple Inland Implementation - [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The next session during the ISSA half-day seminar on Virtualization and Cloud Computing Security was on security best practices from a customer and vendor perspective.  It featured Brian Engle, CIO of Temple Inland, and Rob Randell, CISSP and Senior Security Specialist at VMware, Inc.  My notes from the presentation are below:</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Temple Inland Implementation - Stage 1</strong></span></p>
<p>Overcome Hurdles</p>
<ul>
<li>Management skeptical of Windows virtualization</li>
</ul>
<p>Don't Fear the Virtual World</p>
<ul>
<li>First year:
<ul>
<li>Built out development only environment</li>
<li>Trained staff</li>
<li>Developed support processes</li>
<li>Showed hard dollar savings</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Temple Inland - Stage 2</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Build QA environment</li>
<li>Improve processes</li>
<li>Develop rapid provisioning</li>
<li>Demonstrate advanced functions
<ul>
<li>Vmotion</li>
<li>P2V Conversions</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Temple Inland - Stage 3</strong></span></p>
<p>First production environment</p>
<p>Temple-Inland Implementation</p>
<ul>
<li>Prior to VMWare. Typical remote facility
<ul>
<li>Physical domain controller</li>
<li>Physical application/file server</li>
<li>Physical tape drive</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>New architecture
<ul>
<li>Single VMWare server</li>
<li>No tape drive</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Desktops
<ul>
<li>Virtualize desktops through VMWare</li>
<li>No application issues like Citrix Metaframe</li>
<li>Quick deployment and repair</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>How Virtualization Affects Datacenter Security</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Abstraction and Consolidation
<ul>
<li>+Capital and Operational Cost Savings</li>
<li>-New infrastructure layer to be secured</li>
<li>-Greater impact of attack or misconfiguration</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Collapse of Switches and servers into one device
<ul>
<li>+Flexibility</li>
<li>+Cost-savings</li>
<li>-Lack of virtual network visibility</li>
<li>-No separation-by-default of administration</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Temple-Inland split the teams so that there was a virtual network administration team within the server administration team.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>How Virtualization Affects Datacenter Security</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Faster deployment of servers
<ul>
<li>+ IT responsiveness</li>
<li>-Lack of adequate planning</li>
<li>-Incomplete knowledge of current state of infrastructure</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>VM Mobility
<ul>
<li>+Improved Service Levels</li>
<li>-Identity divorced from physical location</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>VM Encapsulation
<ul>
<li>+Ease of business continuity</li>
<li>+Consistency of deployment</li>
<li>+Hardware Independence</li>
<li>-Outdated offline systems</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Build anti-virus, client firewalls, etc into the offline images so that servers are up-to-date right when they are installed.</p>
<p>If something happens to a system, you can't just pull the plug anymore.  You have to have policies and processes in place.</p>
<p>With virtualization you can have a true "gold image" instead of having different images for all of the different types of hardware.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Security Advantages of Virtualization</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Allows automation of many manual error prone processes</li>
<li>Cleaner and easier disaster recovery/business continuity</li>
<li>Better forensics capabilities</li>
<li>Faster recovery after an attack</li>
<li>Patching is safer and more effective</li>
<li>Better control over desktop resources</li>
<li>More cost effective security devices</li>
<li>App virtualization allows de-privileging of end users</li>
<li>Better lifecycle controls</li>
<li>Future: Security through VM Introspection</li>
</ul>
<p>Gartner: "Like their physical counterparts, most security vulnerabilities will be introduced through misconfiguration"</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>What Not to Worry About</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Hypervisor Attacks
<ul>
<li>ALL theoretical, highly complex attacks</li>
<li>Widely recognized by security community as being only of academic interest</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Irrelevant Architectures
<ul>
<li>Apply only to hosted architecture (ie. Workstation) not bare-metal (ie. ESX)</li>
<li>Hosted architecture generally suitable only when you can trust the guest VM</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Contrived Scenarios
<ul>
<li>Involved exploits where best practices around hardening, lockdown, desgin, for virtualization etc not followed or</li>
<li>Poor general IT infrastructure security is assumed</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Are there any Hypervisor Attack Vectors?</strong></span></p>
<p>There are currently no known hypervisor attack vectors to date that have lead to "VM Escape"</p>
<ul>
<li>Architecture Vulnerability
<ul>
<li>Designed specifically with isolation in mind</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Software Vulnerability - Possible like with any code written by humans
<ul>
<li>Mitigating Circumstances:
<ul>
<li>Small Code Footprint of Hypervisor (~21MB) is easier to audit</li>
<li>If a software vulnerability is found, exploit difficulty will be very high
<ul>
<li>Purpose build for virtualization only</li>
<li>Non-interactive environment</li>
<li>Less code for hackers to leverage</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Ultimately depends on VMWare security response and patching</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Concern: Virtualizing the DMZ/Mixing Trust Zones</strong></span></p>
<p>Three Primary Configurations</p>
<ul>
<li>Physical separation of trust zones</li>
<li>Virtual separation of trust zones with physical security devices</li>
<li>Fully collapsing all servers and security devices into a VI3 infrastructure</li>
</ul>
<p>Also applies to PCI requirement</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Physical Separation of Trust Zones</strong></span></p>
<p>Advantages</p>
<ul>
<li>Simpler, less complex configuration</li>
<li>Less change to physical environment</li>
<li>Little change to separation of duties</li>
<li>Less change in staff knowledge requirements</li>
<li>Smaller chance of misconfiguration</li>
</ul>
<p>Disadvantages</p>
<ul>
<li>Lower consolidation and utilization of resources</li>
<li>Higher cost</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Virtual Separation of Trust Zones with Physical Security Devices</strong></span></p>
<p>Advantages</p>
<ul>
<li>Better utilization of resources</li>
<li>Take full advantage of virtualization benefits</li>
<li>Lower cost</li>
</ul>
<p>Disadvantages (can be mitigated)</p>
<ul>
<li>More complexity</li>
<li>Greater chance of misconfiguration</li>
</ul>
<p>Getting more toward "the cloud" where web zone, app zone, and DB zone are all virtualized on the same system, but still using physical firewalls.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Fully Collapsed Trust Zones Including Security Devices</strong></span></p>
<p>Advantages</p>
<ul>
<li>Full utilization of resources, replacing physical security devices with virtual</li>
<li>Lowest-cost option</li>
<li>Management of entire DMZ and network from a single management workstation</li>
</ul>
<p>Disadvantages</p>
<ul>
<li>Greatest complexity, which in turn creates highest chance of misconfiguration</li>
<li>Requirement for explicit configuration to define separation of duties to help mitigate risk of misconfiguration; also requires regualar audits of configurations</li>
<li>Potential loss of certain functionality, such as VMotion (being mitigated by vendors and VMsafe)</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>How do we secure our Virtual Infrastructure?</strong></span></p>
<p>Use the principles of Information Security</p>
<ul>
<li>Hardening and lockdown</li>
<li>Defense in depth</li>
<li>Authorization, authentication, and accounting</li>
<li>Separation of duties and least privileges</li>
<li>Administrative controls</li>
</ul>
<p>Protect your management interfaces (VCenter)!  They are the keys to the kingdom.</p>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Fundamental Design Principles</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Isolate all management networks</li>
<li>Disable all unneeded services</li>
<li>Tightly regualte all administrative access</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="text-decoration: underline;"><strong>Summary</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Define requirements and ensure vendor/product can deliver
<ul>
<li>Consider culture, capability, maturity, architecture and security needs</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Implement under controlled conditions using a defined methodology
<ul>
<li>Use the opportunity to improve control deficiencies in existing physical server areas if possible</li>
<li>Implement processes for review and validation of controls to prevent the introduction of weaknesses</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Round corners where your control environment allows
<ul>
<li>Sustain sound practices that maintain required controls</li>
<li>Leverage the technology to achieve efficiency and improve scale</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
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